One Term Only

Sources

Full source library

Every numbered citation across the evidence pages resolves to an entry here. Links open the original study, report, or dataset.

Sources

Every study, report, and dataset

Every number on this page links to the original report or study below.

Showing 5 of 34 sources

  1. 1

    Jennifer E. Manning. “Membership of the 119th Congress: A Profile.” CRS Report R48535, updated August 4, 2025.

    Government records · U.S. Congress, 119th Congress membership profile.

    Used for: Prior elected service, previous offices, and average congressional tenure.

    Last reviewed 2026-08-07

    Open original source
  2. 2

    “Statistical Summary of 15-Month Campaign Activity of the 2025–2026 Election Cycle.” Federal Election Commission, July 9, 2026.

    Government records · U.S. federal campaign finance, January 1, 2025 through March 31, 2026.

    Used for: Candidate, party, PAC, leadership-PAC, and independent-expenditure totals through March 31, 2026.

    Last reviewed 2026-08-07

    Open original source
  3. 3

    Joshua L. Kalla and David E. Broockman. “Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment.” American Journal of Political Science 60(3), 2016, 545–558.

    Reviewed by other researchers · Randomized field experiment across 191 U.S. congressional offices; measures access, not votes. · DOI 10.1111/ajps.12180

    Used for: Donor status and access to senior congressional policymakers.

    Last reviewed 2026-08-07

    Open original sourceOpen-access copy
  4. 4

    Eleanor Neff Powell and Justin Grimmer. “Money in Exile: Campaign Contributions and Committee Access.” The Journal of Politics 78(4), 2016.

    Reviewed by other researchers · U.S. Congress; observational study using committee “exile” as an identification strategy. · DOI 10.1086/686615

    Used for: How business contributions move when lawmakers gain or lose committee access.

    Last reviewed 2026-08-07

    Open original source
  5. 5

    Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi. “Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process.” NBER Working Paper 16765, 2011; published in American Economic Review 104(12), 2014.

    Early research, not yet reviewed · U.S. federal lobbying market; lobbyist issue portfolios and earnings.

    Used for: Whether political connections or issue expertise better explain lobbyist behavior and pay.

    Last reviewed 2026-08-07

    Open original source

Showing 5 of 34 sources

Method

How we handle evidence

The short version: the rules we follow before we publish a claim, and the kinds of statements this research does not let anyone make.

How we handle evidence

  • Prefer original peer-reviewed studies and official government data.
  • Link the original source rather than a news summary whenever possible.
  • Separate direct findings from movement interpretation.
  • State geography, institution, time period, and research design.
  • Publish limitations and credible contrary findings.
  • Do not turn access evidence into a claim that a vote was purchased.
  • Do not generalize state or foreign findings to all U.S. offices without a scope warning.
  • Date every source review.
  • Correct or retire claims when stronger evidence appears.

Last substantive research review: August 7, 2026.

Language this research does not justify

  • Every officeholder becomes corrupt after one term.
  • Every later-term vote is worse than a first-term vote.
  • Every campaign contribution buys a vote.
  • Foreign governments control members of Congress.
  • Experience has no value.
  • One-term service guarantees honest or effective government.
  • Traditional term limits always end political careers.
  • A first victory proves voters can never remove an incumbent.
  • Fundraising is the only reason lawmakers gain leadership positions.
  • Turnover eliminates lobbying or special-interest influence.
  • A political relative is necessarily unqualified.
  • Post-office employment proves corruption.
  • Every donation causes later legislative action.

The evidence supports concern about accumulated incentives, access, networks, and institutional power. It does not support universal claims about every person’s character or every vote.

Back to the research

The findings these sources support, each with its limitation and the best argument against it.

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Back to the documented cases

The primary-source archive of personal term-limit promises made in Congress.

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Read the articles

Outside reporting on entrenchment, incumbency, and congressional careers.

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