Research & Source Library
What the evidence supports—and what it does not
The case for One Term Only should be strong enough to survive contact with the strongest evidence against it. Here we separate measured findings from our interpretation, publish the limitations, and link every major factual claim to its source.
Our standard: source the claim, define its scope, publish its limitation, and show the strongest credible counterevidence.
Snapshot
Four numbers that describe the present system
The short version: serving in Congress is usually a long career that starts in another elected job, and it runs on a lot of money.
Each figure comes from an official government source and links to it.
70%
of House members had previously held elected office
Almost 3 out of every 4 House members had already won some other election before this one.
119th Congress, as profiled by the Congressional Research Service.
82%
of senators had previously held elected office
More than 4 out of every 5 senators had already held an elected job somewhere else.
Local, state, or federal elected service before entering the Senate.
45
senators previously served in the House
Those years in the House are not counted in the Senate's average, so real careers are longer than they look.
Their prior House service is not included in the Senate’s average-tenure figure.
$2.1B
raised by 2026 congressional candidates
That is money raised well before Election Day, reported in official federal filings.
January 1, 2025 through March 31, 2026; official FEC filings.
These figures describe the present system. They do not, by themselves, prove that any individual officeholder is corrupt or that one-term service would produce better outcomes.
What the labels mean
- Government records
- A government report or official filing.
- Reviewed by other researchers
- Published only after independent experts checked the work.
- Solid evidence
- The finding is well supported and widely accepted.
- Supports our case
- The finding backs part of our argument.
- Researchers disagree
- Credible experts read this evidence differently.
- Argues against us
- Evidence that cuts against very short time in office.
Scope
The claim we can defend—and the claim we cannot
The short version: here is exactly what this evidence proves, and exactly what it does not. We would rather say it ourselves than have someone catch us overstating it.
Supported
Repeated political careers create recurring fundraising demands, accumulated donor and endorsement networks, party advancement incentives, institutional leverage, and relationships whose value grows with access and seniority. The research below documents those structures.
Not established
We have not found credible evidence establishing that every officeholder performs well in a first term and then immediately begins voting worse in a second term. Research on congressional voting is more complicated: positions may change in response to party, institutions, elections, redistricting, and constituency preferences; some studies find greater stability or less party-line voting with seniority.
One Term Only therefore rests on a structural-risk judgment—not a claim that every long-serving person becomes morally worse.
The evidence, part by part
What kind of evidence are you looking for?
The short version: pick the part you care about. Real broken promises, the research behind the argument, the case against us, or the full list of sources.
Each part stands on its own and can be read in a sitting. Nothing has been removed — it is organized so you can reach the part that answers your question.
Cases
Broken promises
41 documented cases
Federal lawmakers who personally promised to limit their own service — what each one said, what happened next, and the sources for both.
See the cases →
Research
What the research shows
Peer-reviewed and official data
How political careers compound: name recognition, donors, committee money, networks, and the private-market value of a seat.
Read the research →
Tradeoffs
What cuts the other way
The strongest case against us
Contested findings, the documented costs of very short tenure, and the experience objection answered honestly.
Read the counterevidence →
Sources
Full source library
34 sources
Every study, report, and dataset cited across these pages, plus the standard we hold ourselves to before publishing a claim.
Open the sources →
Videos
Watch the case made elsewhere
5 videos
Talks and documentaries we did not produce, each with a short note on how it connects to voter-enforced term limits.
Open the videos →
Articles
Reporting worth your time
5 articles
Outside reporting and reference reading on entrenchment and congressional careers, with the same note on relevance.
Open the articles →
Social
What we are posting
X, Instagram, and Facebook
Our own accounts in one place — the same argument in the short form it travels in, embedded live.
Open social →
The evidence supports a cumulative-system argument: office can produce career opportunities; victory can create incumbency and financial advantages; fundraising can contribute to internal standing; institutional power and network position can attract additional resources; and relationships can retain economic value after office. The evidence also shows that turnover can disrupt some of those networks. It does not prove that every officeholder abuses the system or that one-term service is free of serious tradeoffs.
The evidence is published in full, counterevidence included.
Read as much of it as you want. If the case holds for you, adopt the rule.
Prefer to read it first? Read the full pledge before you sign.